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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE:
EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDS NORTH
DAKOTA’S NONRESIDENT HUNTING REGULATIONS,
REAFFIRMING STATES’ RIGHTS TO REGULATE WILDLIFE
RESOURCES WITHIN THEIR BORDERS
Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006)
I.

FACTS

In 2001, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly directed the Legislative Council to study the conflict between resident hunters and nonresident
hunters.1 The committee reported an increase in the number of nonresident
hunters in North Dakota from about 5500 in 1990, to about 30,000 in 2001.2
The growth of nonresident hunters upset resident hunters because they were
forced to compete for optimal hunting locations.3 Residents claimed that
the better hunting locations often determined the success of the hunt.4
On the other hand, the influx of additional hunters provided economic
growth for many small North Dakota towns.5 Nonresident waterfowl hunters spent nearly twenty-one million dollars in direct expenditures, created
an estimated 1300 jobs, two million dollars in tax collections, and forty-five
million dollars in secondary economic effects.6 The business sector opposed restricting nonresident hunting because of the increased profits
generated by the hunters.7
As a result of these findings, the North Dakota Legislature raised
license fees for nonresident hunters from $10 to $85 for waterfowl, and $75
to $85 for small game.8 Residents, on the other hand, had to purchase only
1. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 456 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Hoeven II]; see H.R.
1269, 57th Leg. (N.D. 2001) (studying the conflict between resident hunters and nonresident
hunters).
2. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 828.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-02(45) (2007) (indicating that the term “small game”
includes “all game birds and tree squirrels”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-02(16) (2003) (noting
that the term “game birds” includes “all varieties of geese, brant, swans, ducks, plovers, snipes,
woodcocks, grouse, sagehens, pheasants, Hungarian partridges, quails, partridges, cranes, rails,
coots, wild turkeys, morning doves, and crows”).
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one small game license for $6, rather than purchasing another license to
hunt waterfowl together with pheasants and grouse, as nonresidents were
required to do.9 North Dakota also excluded nonresidents from hunting
during the opening week of waterfowl season.10 Additionally, North
Dakota restricted access for nonresidents by prohibiting nonresidents from
hunting on land owned and regulated by the Game and Fish Department
during the first week of pheasant season.11
Minnesota’s Attorney General responded by filing a civil suit against
North Dakota’s Governor, seeking a declaratory judgment to enjoin hunting
restrictions to the extent that they favored North Dakota residents.12 The
Attorney General’s office based its theories on both the Commerce Clause13
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause14 of the United States Constitution.15 The district court denied Minnesota’s subsequent motion for summary judgment on its Commerce Clause claims, and granted North
Dakota’s cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that North Dakota’s
regulation did not affect “persons in commerce” or activity “substantially
affecting interstate commerce.”16 The court did not consider North
Dakota’s motion to dismiss, noting, “Congressional interpretation of what is
and is not interstate commerce is not controlling on the judicial branch.”17
Finally, the district court dismissed Minnesota’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause claim, finding the case of Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of
Montana18 controlling.19

9. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 828 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-03-03, 20.1-03-12 (2003)).
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-08-04.9 (2003)).
12. Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D.N.D. 2005) [hereinafter Hoeven I].
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” Id. The purpose of the Commerce Clause “was to establish a perfect equality amongst
the several States as to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and invidious distinctions, which
local jealousies or local and partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.” Veazie
v. Moor, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 568, 574 (1853).
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states, “[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.” Id. The secured privileges and immunities are those that “are common to the citizens in
the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens. . . . It was not
intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States.” Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
15. Hoeven I, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 969, 971.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 973 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
18. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
19. See Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 834-35 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding Baldwin controlling
because it previously resolved a Privileges and Immunities challenge to nonresident hunting
restrictions).
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Minnesota appealed the district court’s denial of its summary judgment
motion.20 Specifically, Minnesota argued that the nonresident hunting
restrictions violated the dormant Commerce Clause21 and certain property
rights inherent under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.22 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held the dormant Commerce Clause issue moot
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim incapable of providing
relief to Minnesota.23 The court reasoned that the “Reaffirmation of State
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of
2005”24 provided the necessary congressional action to preempt Minnesota’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.25 The Privileges and Immunities
Clause did not provide relief, according to the court, because the Clause
does not protect hunting in the same way that other property rights are
protected.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
historically share a “mutually reinforcing relationship.”27 This relationship
“stems from their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of
Confederation and their shared vision of federalism.”28 Both clauses

20. Id. at 829; see id. at 829-30 n.6 (referencing the amicus curiae brief supporting North
Dakota, filed jointly by South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
Utah, and Wyoming, which are among the states providing residents with preferred access to
hunting and fishing opportunities).
21. Id. at 831. The court can invalidate state laws discriminating against interstate
commerce, which Minnesota claims to be the effect of the nonresident hunting restrictions. Id.
22. Id. at 830.
23. Id.
24. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6036 (2005).
25. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 832.
26. Id. at 836.
27. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978).
28. Id. at 531-32. In Hicklin, the United States Supreme Court explained:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states,
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided, that
such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property, imported
into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also
that no imposition, duties or restriction, shall be laid by any State on the property of
the United States, or either of them.
Id. at 532 n.16 (citing 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908-09 (1777) (Library of
Congress ed., 1907)).
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recognize the states’ need to be free from federal control, while at the same
time avoiding arbitrary distinctions forced upon nonresidents that may
hinder interstate commerce.29 However, while the two clauses share a similar focus, the analytical framework from which claims are evaluated varies
for each clause.30
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have power [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”31 A “positive” Commerce Clause challenge asks
whether Congress has exceeded its authority in regulating certain activities.32 The United States Supreme Court has also read a “negative” or “dormant” element into this affirmative language that allows courts to invalidate
state laws that are discriminatory to interstate commerce.33 The purpose of
invalidating discriminatory state statutes is to protect against the economic
isolationism that hindered the early formation of the states.34 Instead of
retaliating against other states by taking protectionist measures, states form
a more solid union with each other through enforcement of the dormant
Commerce Clause.35
While remaining vigilant against economic isolationism, courts struggled to protect a state’s ability to benefit its own citizens.36 The test used
by courts for Commerce Clause challenges is two-fold: first, it must be
determined whether the challenged law discriminates against interstate
commerce.37 Discrimination, in this context, is equivalent to differential
treatment benefiting in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic
interests.38 In the second part of the test, if a state law does discriminate
29. Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *25-26 (D.
Wyo. May 28, 2003), aff’d, Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
30. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2002).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
33. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997)
(“In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of the States.”) (citation omitted); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981) (“Even in the absence of congressional action, the
courts may decide whether state regulations challenged under the Commerce Clause
impermissibly burden interstate commerce.”) (citation omitted).
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979); see Camps, 520 U.S. at 578 (“By
encouraging economic isolationism, prohibitions on out-of-state access to in-state resources serve
the very evil that the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.”).
35. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335.
36. Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 991.
37. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004).
38. Id. (quoting S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 593 (8th Cir. 2003)).
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against interstate commerce, strict scrutiny is applied to assess whether the
state’s discrimination is narrowly tailored to further a legitimate state
interest.39 If the law does not discriminate, but only incidentally affects
interstate commerce, the law will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”40
Historically, Commerce Clause challenges in wildlife regulation cases
have centered on whether interstate commerce is implicated.41 In Geer v.
Connecticut,42 a Connecticut statute prohibited the out-of-state transfer of
game birds that were lawfully killed within the state.43 The United States
Supreme Court held that the people of a state own wildlife collectively, and
thus, the state, as the representative for the people, could affix conditions in
association with the ownership of wild game.44 Following this principle,
the Court then distinguished interstate commerce from internal commerce,
finding the former not applicable because of the state’s right to affix conditions relative to ownership and taking of wild game within its borders.45
One of these conditions of common ownership related to the challenged
statute itself, because Connecticut had a right to keep the property within its
jurisdiction by forbidding the removal of wild game from state borders.46
Over several decades, the United States Supreme Court gradually
retreated from the ownership view taken in Geer.47 In Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc.,48 the Supreme Court definitively rejected the theory.49 In
39. Id.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 532 (1896) (finding no relation to interstate
commerce in the state’s control of wildlife within its borders); State v. McCullagh, 153 P. 557,
558 (Kan. 1915) (“The natural flight of wild fowl from one point to another does not constitute
‘commerce,’ unless that word be expanded beyond any significance heretofore given it.”). But see
Conservation Force, Inc., 301 F.3d at 995 (concluding the hunting of bull elk and antlered deer
substantially affects interstate commerce).
42. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
43. Geer, 161 U.S. at 519.
44. Id. at 529.
45. Id. at 530-31.
46. Id. at 529-30; see also McCullagh, 153 P. at 559 (recognizing the ability of states to grant
hunting privileges to residents and to the exclusion of nonresidents based on the state’s control
over wild animals).
47. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1928) (distinguishing
Geer to find an act that prohibited the exportation of shrimp to be in violation of the Commerce
Clause); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“Wild birds are not in the possession of
anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership”); West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S.
229, 262 (1911) (finding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the transportation of gas out of the state
to be an unjustified restraint upon interstate commerce).
48. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
49. Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284 (“[I]t is pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or
animals.”).
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Douglas, a Virginia statute restricted the ability of nonresidents to obtain
licenses for certain kinds of fish in selected areas.50 The Court called the
Geer sense of ownership “a nineteenth-century legal fiction” and instead
asked whether the state exceeded its boundaries under its police power. 51
The Court held that Virginia surpassed its afforded police power by granting residents, but not nonresidents, the right to destroy a natural resource,
which did not square with any asserted conservation interest.52
The United States Supreme Court reinforced the Douglas holding just
two years later in Hughes v. Oklahoma,53 which involved a Commerce
Clause challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale or transfer of
minnows outside of the state.54 The Court expressly overruled Geer,
presenting the issue as:
(1) [W]hether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with
only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect;
(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so,
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as
well without discriminating against interstate commerce.55
Following this analytical framework, the Court found that the statute
intruded upon interstate commerce.56 While the statute served a legitimate
purpose, the Court ultimately held that Oklahoma did not choose the least
discriminatory alternative for conservation because no limits were imposed
intrastate, and instead limits were only imposed on the out-of-state transfer.57 After Hughes, states may still regulate and conserve wildlife within
their borders, but the state must have a legitimate purpose that is not
contrary to interstate commerce.58
By finding this required legitimate purpose, the Ninth Circuit, in
Conservation Force v. Manning,59 upheld Arizona’s ten-percent cap on
nonresident hunting of bull elk and antlered deer.60 First, the Ninth Circuit

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 269.
Id. at 284-85.
Id. at 285 & n.21.
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 325, 335-36.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 338-39.
301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
Conservation Force, Inc., 301 F.3d at 988.
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tested whether the regulation affected interstate commerce.61 The court
discussed the non-recreational aspects of hunting, such as selling portions
of the wildlife in interstate and international markets.62 By excluding nonresidents from these markets, the court concluded that the regulation “burdens interstate commerce at its point of supply.”63
The Ninth Circuit next addressed Arizona’s interests in conserving
wildlife and preserving hunting opportunities for residents.64 The court first
agreed with Arizona that these interests were legitimate, because it recognized the solid history of upholding states’ rights to protect wildlife and
provide recreation to their people.65 However, the court questioned whether
Arizona’s regulation was narrowly tailored, because a state must show more
to discriminate than political demand or pressure from other states.66 This
political pressure provided a speculative basis for the regulation, rather than
any actual need for more hunting opportunities by Arizona residents,
because the residents received more than eighty percent of the hunting tags
issued and experienced little nonresident pressure.67 Thus, the court remanded the case to determine whether Arizona met its burden.68
In Schutz v. Wyoming69 the district court of Wyoming reached a directly conflicting result with Conservation Force.70 Schutz involved a challenge to three game statutes that provided benefits to residents over nonresidents.71 First, the court refused to apply a dormant Commerce Clause
analysis because Toomer v. Witsell72 and Hughes decided that an animal is
not an article of interstate commerce until it has been captured or killed.73
The court also relied on Baldwin,74 which, although decided in a Privileges
and Immunities Clause context, held a very similar quota statute

61. Id. at 993.
62. Id. at 994.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 996.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 999.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1000.
69. No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518 (D. Wyo. May 29, 2003), aff’d, Schutz
v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
70. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *29.
71. Id. at *2.
72. 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The United States Supreme Court in Toomer found commercial
shrimping to be protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, in part because migratory
shrimp traveled between different waters. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 401-03.
73. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *22-23.
74. Baldwin found that elk hunting was not protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
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constitutional.75 Conservation Force, according to the Schutz court, made
“a curious jump in logic” when it ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in
Baldwin in favor of a “substantial effects on interstate commerce” analysis.76 The state did not regulate economic activity, but merely controlled
the activity of hunting, according to the court.77 Thus, the court found the
dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable to the statutes.78
At the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis because congressional action made
the claim moot.79 The Tenth Circuit noted that a constitutional claim must
be alive at all stages, including during appellate review.80 Additionally,
when Congress acts, it terminates any dormant Commerce Clause claim
because the dormant Commerce Clause is based on congressional silence.81
Congress provided this action when it passed the “Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, 2005.”82 This Act explicitly stated that it is in the public interest for
states to distinguish between residents and nonresidents in regulating the
taking of wildlife.83 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found the dormant Commerce
Clause claim moot when this Act was signed into law.84 The Tenth Circuit’s holding appears to be more consistent with previous case law, rather
than the Ninth Circuit’s “unprecedented” ruling.85
B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The Privileges and Immunities Clause states, “The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.”86 The purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
like the Commerce Clause, is to “help fuse into one Nation a collection of

75. Schutz, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at *26.
76. Id. at *25.
77. Id. at *29.
78. Id.
79. Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005).
80. Id. Schutz cited Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997), which
held that the case and controversy “must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time
the complaint is filed.” Id.
81. Id. Schutz found that Congress “unmistakably foreclosed dormant Commerce Clause
petitions challenging state hunting and fishing statutes that treat nonresidents differently than
residents.” Id.
82. Id. (referring to H.R. 1268, Section 6063).
83. Id. (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 108th Cong. § 6036 (2005)).
84. Id.
85. Hoeven I, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 972 (D.N.D. 2005).
86. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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independent, sovereign States.”87 However, this does not mean a nonresident is entitled to every privilege as a resident of a state.88 Rather, the
privileges and immunities protected are those common to citizens among
the states.89
Like the Commerce Clause analysis, a court must undergo a two-part
inquiry to assess whether the differential treatment of nonresidents violates
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.90 The first part of the inquiry
addresses whether a privilege or immunity protected by the Clause is implicated in the discrimination.91 Some distinctions are permitted because the
courts recognize that certain inherent differences will arise among the
several states.92 The second prong of the test seeks to determine if there is a
privilege or immunity implicated, and whether sufficient justification exists
for the differential treatment.93 When assessing the sufficient justification
prong, courts hearing challenges under the Clause should recognize “the
principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local
evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.”94
The two prongs are not clearly defined guidelines in application due to
a lackluster case law history.95 Like the Commerce Clause, early cases
established that the state had complete control over wildlife within its
borders.96 In Corfield v. Coryell,97 the Circuit Court in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania analyzed whether a state act regulating oyster control
implicated fundamental privileges and immunities.98 While the court
declined to enumerate every fundamental privilege and immunity, the court
specified certain general categories: “[p]rotection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject
87. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (footnote omitted).
88. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (“There are privileges that may be
accorded by a State to its own people in which citizens of other States may not participate except
in conformity to such reasonable regulations as may be established by the State.”).
89. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
90. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984).
91. Id.
92. See id. (“Only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident,
equally.”).
93. Id. at 222.
94. Id. at 222-23 (citation omitted).
95. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978).
96. Id. at 384.
97. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). The Court described Corfield as “the first,
and long the leading, explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause.” Baldwin, 436 U.S. at
384 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975)).
98. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
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nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole.”99 The court in Corfield concluded the state
could restrict access to the oyster beds because the oyster beds might be
completely destroyed if the state was unable to regulate their use and
exclude nonresidents.100
In Paul v. Virginia,101 the United States Supreme Court again stressed
the freedom enjoyed by citizens in the “acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness.”102 The Court stated that these enjoyed
privileges are those that are enjoyed in one’s own state.103 The specific
holding in Paul turned largely on an analysis of a corporation’s status as a
citizen of the state.104 The Court ultimately held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause did not protect a New York insurance company doing
business in Virginia.105
The United States Supreme Court in McCready v. Virginia106 reiterated
the Corfield analysis of protecting only fundamental privileges and immunities.107 McCready, like Corfield, involved a statute excluding nonresidents, but not residents, from planting oysters.108 The United States
Supreme Court again refused to establish specific categories of fundamental
privileges and immunities, opting instead for a case-by-case determination.109 The particular right of a nonresident to plant oysters that was
asserted in McCready was not fundamental, and thus did not trigger protection by the Clause.110 Rather, it was a common property right held by the
citizens of Virginia.111
The United States Supreme Court decided another corporate privileges
matter in Blake v. McClung,112 where a Tennessee statute gave creditors in
that state priority over out-of-state creditors.113 The Court held that this
statute offended the Privileges and Immunities Clause because creditors
should not be discriminated against merely because they do not reside in the
99. Id. at 551-52.
100. Id. at 552.
101. 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
102. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
103. Id. at 180-81.
104. Id. at 182.
105. Id.
106. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
107. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395.
108. Id. at 394.
109. Id. at 395.
110. Id. at 395-96.
111. Id.
112. 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
113. Blake, 172 U.S. at 247.
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state.114 The Court again reaffirmed that not all Privileges are protected,
rather, “[t]he Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of
the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one
State in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to
another State.”115
While supporting ownership rights in some cases, the United States
Supreme Court refused to establish any absolute ownership rights.116 In
Toomer, a South Carolina statute restricted nonresidents from trawling for
migratory shrimp in certain waters.117 The nonresidents specifically challenged the imposed license fees, which South Carolina set at a price one
hundred times greater than the residents’ license fees.118 According to the
Toomer Court, these license fees clearly discriminated against nonresidents,
thus meeting the first prong of the analysis.119 Under the second prong,
South Carolina justified the license fee discrepancy by claiming underlying
conservation purposes.120 The Court rejected this argument, however, because the conservation aims could have been achieved through less severe
methods than the one chosen, which effectively excluded all nonresidents.121 The facts in Toomer were also distinguished from McCready,
because the former involved migratory fish in different waters.122 This
distinction compelled the United States Supreme Court to reject an extension to McCready, and instead to find commercial shrimping protected by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.123
Despite the law’s evolution away from the ownership theory in Geer,
courts have continued to reaffirm the states’ power to regulate wildlife
within its borders.124 For example, in State v. Kemp,125 the South Dakota
Supreme Court upheld a statute that completely excluded nonresidents from
hunting migratory wildfowl.126 The South Dakota Supreme Court conceded

114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 256.
116. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978).
117. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 389.
118. Id. at 395.
119. Id. at 396-97.
120. Id. at 397.
121. Id. at 398-99.
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id. at 403.
124. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978). The Court stated in
Baldwin that “[t]he fact that the State’s control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the
face of federal regulation and certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion
that it is meaningless in their absence.” Id.
125. 44 N.W.2d 214 (S.D. 1950).
126. Kemp, 44 N.W.2d at 219.
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the diminished effect of the complete ownership theory and held the state’s
police power was an adequate basis for enacting the statute.127 The court
deferred to the state’s ability to cure local problems and its holding recognized the dangers of destruction posed from exhaustive nonresident hunting.128 The Kemp court also reinforced the difference acknowledged in
Toomer between the right of an individual to make a living through commercial hunting, and hunting for sport or enjoyment with no regard to
making a livelihood.129 The Clause affords no protection to the latter.130
The modern seminal case in hunting rights analysis is Baldwin, which
found that elk hunting was not within the fundamental rights protected by
the Clause.131 In Baldwin, a nonresident was charged seven and a half
times more than a resident for a combination license, or twenty-five times
more than a resident if he wished to only hunt elk.132 In its analysis, the
United States Supreme Court first insisted on the continuing vitality of its
earlier decisions concerning the pursuit of a common calling and other basic
activities.133 The Court refused to recognize elk hunting as one of these
protected rights, however, and, instead, determined it was recreation and
sport.134 It was not a means to one’s livelihood or basic to the “well-being
of the Union.”135 As in its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court again refused to define specific protected privileges and immunities; it sufficed to
determine that elk hunting was not one of them.136 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Hoeven analogized waterfowl hunting to the unprotected elk hunting in Baldwin, and thus upheld the nonresident hunting
restrictions as constitutional under the Clause.137
III. ANALYSIS
In Hoeven, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld
North Dakota’s restrictions on nonresident waterfowl hunting within the
state.138 The court sought to determine whether the hunting restrictions

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id.
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 834.
Id. at 827.
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violated the Commerce Clause.139 The merits of this issue were never
reached, however, because the enactment of the “Reaffirmation of State
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005”
rendered the Commerce Clause claim moot.140
Next, the court analyzed whether the nonresident hunting restrictions
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.141 The court foreclosed the
issue on the first prong of the analytical framework because recreational
hunting is not a fundamental right protected by the Clause.142 Furthermore,
while the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects property rights, these
property rights do not include hunting, according to the court, and thus
hunting rights garner no protection under the Clause.143
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Minnesota claimed that North Dakota’s nonresident hunting restrictions violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the restrictions bar
thousands of nonresidents from traveling to North Dakota to hunt
waterfowl.144 These nonresidents, according to Minnesota, are persons in
commerce that engage in activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.145 Minnesota primarily relied on Conservation Force, where
Arizona placed a ten percent cap on the number of nonresident tags for bull
elk and antlered deer.146 Conservation Force found the dormant Commerce
Clause applicable because, according to the court, the hunting of bull elk
and antlered deer substantially affects interstate commerce.147
While the court acknowledged the economic growth generated by
nonresident hunting in North Dakota, it declined to address the merits of the
Commerce Clause claim because Section 6063 of H.R. 1268, the
“Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting
and Fishing Act of 2005,” rendered the claim moot.148 President George W.
Bush signed this Act into law on May 10, 2005, while this case was
139. Id. at 831.
140. Id. at 831-32.
141. Id. at 833-34.
142. Id. at 834.
143. Id. at 836.
144. Id. at 831 (citing Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 39, Hoeven v. Minnesota, No. 05-3012
(8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 833 (citing Conservation Force v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2002)).
147. Id. at 832 n.7 (citing Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 995).
148. Id. at 831. Though the larger scope of H.R. 1268 (the “Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief”) was not
germane to the present case, Section 6063 (the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and
Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005”) applied directly to the issue before the court. Id.

1042

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1029

pending appeal.149 The Act stated that it was in the public interest for states
to regulate fish and wildlife within its boundaries.150 These regulations
include distinguishing between residents and nonresidents in licenses or
permits, in the type of wildlife that may be taken, or in the fees the state
charges to issue hunting licenses.151 Finally, the Act stated that congressional silence is not a barrier to states’ regulation of hunting or fishing.152
In construing the Act, the Eighth Circuit discussed Schutz v. Thorne,153
a Tenth Circuit case involving a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
Wyoming’s nonresident hunting license fee scheme.154 Schutz stated that
“[t]he essential element of a dormant Commerce Clause claim is congressional inaction, so when Congress does act, the dormancy ends, thus leaving the courts obliged to follow congressional will.”155 Schutz found that
H.R. 1268 provided for this congressional action, ending the dormancy and
rendering the claim moot.156
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit by finding H.R. 1268
sufficient to end Minnesota’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.157 First,
the Eighth Circuit overruled the district court’s analysis that “[c]ongressional interpretation of what is and is not commerce is not controlling on
the judicial branch.”158 This premise was based on United States v.
Lopez,159 which involved a “positive” Commerce Clause challenge to

149. Id. The test for mootness applies at all stages of the judicial process, including during
appellate review. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (“[A]n
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is
filed.”) (citation omitted); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (“A case is
moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.”) (citation omitted); Republican Party v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir.
2004) (reinforcing that federal courts cannot give opinions on abstract questions of law that are
not materially before the court).
150. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 831 (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6036 (2005)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 832 (quoting Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)).
156. Id.
157. Id.; see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 72 (1997) (finding the
claim moot when the plaintiff took up private sector employment, where her speech was not
governed by the article at issue); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451
U.S. 648, 655 (1981) (rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to California’s retaliatory
tax because the McCarran-Ferguson Act removed any Commerce Clause limitations on the states
to regulate insurance); Republican Party v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
claims moot when the criminal charges, which were a necessary element to the claims, were
dismissed).
158. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 2006).
159. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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congressional action in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.160
The present case, on the other hand, arose out of a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.161 In a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the court
determines “whether the state’s law discriminates against interstate commerce and whether sufficient justification exists for the burden imposed.”162
The distinction is imperative because, with regard to dormant Commerce
Clause claims, the Supreme Court has held that, “[i]f Congress ordains that
the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is
rendered invulnerable to a Commerce Clause challenge.” 163 Consequently,
H.R. 1268 permitted North Dakota to restrict nonresident hunting in a
manner consistent with the scope of the congressional action.164
Minnesota countered that H.R. 1268 was part of an appropriations bill,
and thus the Congressional action was only a temporary measure.165 While
appropriations acts generally operate for only one fiscal year, the language
of the provision at issue may indicate it is intended to be permanent.166 For
example, an indicia of permanence exists when the provision has no appropriation attached to it.167 However, the critical element is the existence of
words that intend to make the provision apply in the future, because Congress will use these words when it intends to make a provision permanent in
nature.168
The Eighth Circuit interpreted section 6036 to contain these necessary
words of futurity.169 Section 6036(b)(1) provides, “It is the policy of Congress that it is in the public interest for each State to continue to regulate
the taking for any purpose of fish and wildlife within its boundaries, including by means of laws or regulations that differentiate between residents and

160. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 832 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551). The Supreme Court in
Lopez said that Congress “could not decide the outer limits of its power to regulate interstate
commerce.” Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58).
161. Id. at 830.
162. Id. at 831 (citing Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004)).
163. Id. at 832 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 652-53).
164. Id. at 831.
165. Id. at 833.
166. Id. (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273-74 (D.C. Cir.
1992)).
167. Id. (citing United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (Fed. Cir.
1989)); see Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, 961 F.2d at 274 (noting that the absence of an
appropriation is an indication of permanence).
168. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir. 2006); see Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 892 F.2d at
1009 (“Had Congress intended to make the exception permanent, it knew how: it could and we
believe would have used words of futurity, like ‘hereafter, notwithstanding any other provisions of
law[.]’”).
169. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833.
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nonresidents of such State.”170 The language necessarily implies the words
of futurity, as states could not “continue” to regulate hunting consistent
with congressional policy if Congress intended the Act to apply only temporarily.171 Section 6036(b)(2) continues, “[s]ilence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier” to regulation under the
Commerce Clause.172 If Congress intended only temporary action, it would
not give silence the effect of approving continued state regulation.173
Aside from a plain reading of section 6036, the court also considered
the context within which the legislation was passed.174 The court had “no
doubt” that the Act arose in response to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Conservation Force, which found that Arizona’s cap on nonresident
hunting was discriminatory to interstate commerce.175 The Ninth Circuit in
Conservation Force distinguished the facts from Baldwin because the cap
was not limited to recreational hunting.176 Minnesota relied heavily on this
unusual ruling in Conservation Force in constructing its dormant Commerce Clause claim.177 But the Eighth Circuit, while declining to reach the
merits of the dormant Commerce Clause claim, followed the permitted distinctions between nonresidents and residents contained in Congress’s enactment of the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident
Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005.”178
B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Minnesota’s second claim alleged that North Dakota’s nonresident
hunting restrictions violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.179 The
two-pronged Privileges and Immunities Clause framework considers: (1)
whether the law discriminates against a protected privilege or immunity;
170. Id. (quoting H.R. 1268 § 6036(b)(1) (2005)) (emphasis added).
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting H.R. 1268 § 6036(b)(2) (2005)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. (“The committee report expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
‘could have an effect on the thinking of Federal courts across the country.’”) (quoting 151 CONG.
REC. H2997-02, at 3023 (2005)).
176. Id. at 832 n.7; see Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that Arizona’s hunting regulations substantially affect the interstate market of
nonedible portions of bull elk and antlered deer that are sold).
177. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833 (citing Minnesota v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d 960, 971
(D.N.D. 2005)); see Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26518, at
*18-19 (D. Wyo. May 28, 2003), aff’d, Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
Conservation Force to be unprecedented in its Commerce Clause analysis because it is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent).
178. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 833.
179. Id.

2007]

CASE COMMENT

1045

and (2) whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination.180
However, after considering Baldwin, the Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach the second prong of the analysis.181
1.

Fundamental Rights Analysis

The Eighth Circuit turned to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin to determine whether hunting constituted a fundamental
right.182 The Supreme Court recognized that only those privileges and
immunities deemed to be fundamental are protected by the Clause.183 In
Baldwin, the United States Supreme Court encountered a Privileges and
Immunities Clause claim based on Montana’s licensing scheme for elk
hunting, which charged nonresidents significantly higher rates than residents.184 The Baldwin Court determined that elk hunting is a recreational
activity.185 Nonresidents are not excluded from elk hunting, Baldwin maintained, and in fact, many nonresidents sacrifice to participate in the sport.186
Thus, because it is only recreation, the Baldwin Court held elk hunting was
not a fundamental right under the Clause.187 The Eighth Circuit found
waterfowl hunting to be like the elk hunting analyzed in Baldwin; both are
recreation.188 Furthermore, livelihood and the basic right to the well being
of the Union are not implicated in waterfowl hunting.189
2.

Hunting Is Not a Property Right

Minnesota recognized Baldwin’s authority, but distinguished the present facts through a property rights analysis, which was not addressed in
Baldwin.190 According to this argument, North Dakota discriminated against nonresidents who owned or leased property in North Dakota, because

180. Id. at 834 (citing United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218,
221-23 (1984)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)).
184. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d 826, 834 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 378-79).
185. Id. (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 834-35. Baldwin recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents a
state from imposing unreasonable burdens “in the ownership and disposition of privately held
property within the State.” Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (citing Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 258
(1898)).
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they were not able to hunt on their own property in a manner consistent
with resident owners and lessees.191
The Eighth Circuit considered North Dakota law to see whether there is
a property right to hunt associated with the purchase or lease of land.192 At
common law, a landowner did have the right to hunt wildlife on his land.193
However, the North Dakota Constitution provides that hunting “will be
forever preserved for the people and managed by law and regulation for the
public good.”194 Additionally, the North Dakota Century Code reaffirms
the state’s control over wildlife.195 The state owns all wildlife “for the purpose of regulating the enjoyment, use, possession, disposition, and conservation thereof.”196 Furthermore, North Dakota reserves the right to
prescribe the manner, number, place, and time in which wildlife may be
taken.197 Finally, except under certain exceptions, residents and nonresidents may not hunt or take game without a license.198 The Eighth Circuit
also recognized the North Dakota Supreme Court’s approval of these
statutory schemes.199
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that North Dakota permitted
residents to hunt small game, fish, or trap during the open season without a
license on their own land.200 However, the court distinguished the type of
discrimination apparent in this statute—the discrimination is against nonresident recreational hunting, which is not protected under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.201 Furthermore, this provision is only a limited exception to the general prohibition against hunting without a license.202
Finally, Minnesota analogized Paul v. Virginia,203 Corfield, and Blake,
three historical cases dealing with property rights.204 The Eight Circuit

191. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 835.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1575 (10th Cir. 1995)).
194. Id. (citing N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27).
195. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-03 (2003)).
196. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-03 (2003)).
197. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-08-04 (2003)).
198. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 20.1-03-03, -07 (2003)).
199. See id. at 835 (citing State ex rel. Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61
(1972) (holding that the state has the power to set conditions for reducing wildlife to ownership);
State v. Hastings, 41 N.W.2d 305, 308 (N.D. 1950) (following the statutory scheme for acquiring
title to or the right to sell muskrat pelts).
200. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 835 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-03-04 (2003)).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-03-03 (2003)).
203. 75 U.S. 168 (1869).
204. Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 836. Paul discussed citizens’ freedom in acquiring property, and
the recognition of this right in other states. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1869). In
Corfield, the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania categorically recognized the right to acquire and
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recognized the authority of these cases, to the extent they are consistent
with Baldwin in protecting property rights.205 However, the court reasoned
that nothing in these cases or any others establishes hunting as part of the
bundle of property rights associated with the ownership or leasing of
land.206 Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim failed
because North Dakota’s nonresident hunting regulations did not implicate a
fundamental right.207
IV. IMPACT
Hoeven represents a significant reaffirmation of states’ rights to regulate wildlife within their borders.208 North Dakota officials and residents
praised the publicized ruling, while Minnesota officials criticized it as protectionism.209 With the court battle likely over, both sides are contemplating how to best manage wildlife in the future to serve the competing
interests of residents and nonresidents.210
A. STATES’ POWER TO FAVOR RESIDENTS
As a result of Hoeven, states will continue to grant preferred access to
residents over nonresidents in hunting and fishing opportunities.211 This is
evident already in the Kansas district court case Taulman v. Hayden,212
which involved a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge by a nonresident hunter who owned land in Kansas, similar to Hoeven.213 The district
court conducted an analysis that was nearly identical to Hoeven.214 First,
possess property. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). In Blake,
the Supreme Court while reaffirming that not all Privileges are protected, held that a state could
not discriminate against a creditor merely because of its out-of-state status. Blake v. McClung,
172 U.S. 239, 258 (1898).
205. Id.
206. Id. These cases only concern the proposition that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
protects property rights in general. Hunting rights are not held to be part of these protected rights,
however, in any of the cases. Id.
207. See id. (dismissing the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim after finding hunting not
a protected fundamental right).
208. Press Release, N.D. Att’y Gen., North Dakota’s Nonresident Hunting Laws Upheld,
(Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ag.state.nd.us/documents/08-03-06.pdf.
209. Doug Smith, New Bill Won’t Affect State’s Lawsuit, STAR TRIB. (M.N.), May 15, 2005,
at 15C.
210. Tom Rafferty, North Dakota Wins Hunting Case, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Aug. 4,
2006, at 1.
211. See Hoeven II, 456 F.3d at 829 n.6 (providing laws of South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and other states that give preference to
residents over nonresidents in hunting and fishing opportunities).
212. No. 05-1118, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493 (D. Kan. Sept. 13, 2006).
213. Taulman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65493, at *1.
214. Id. at *12.
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the court recognized that only fundamental rights are protected.215 Next,
the district court analogized the facts of the case to Baldwin.216 The plaintiff in Taulman distinguished this case from Baldwin, however, because he
did not hunt for recreation, but rather “to teach his children about hunting
traditions, use the animals for food, use the animal hides and antlers,
strengthen family bonds, and instill an appreciation of nature.”217 The
district court found that these motivations, although valid, were still not
basic to the well-being of the Union, and thus not fundamental and deserving of protection.218
The district court in Taulman then directly followed Hoeven in its
determination of a landowner’s right to hunt.219 Like the Eighth Circuit, the
Kansas district court looked to state law to determine the nature of the
landowner’s right to hunt.220 While the statutory scheme differed slightly
between Kansas and North Dakota, the district court arrived at the same
conclusion, finding that the right of a nonresident landowner to access his
land in the same manner as residents was not fundamental.221 The district
court thus declined to reach the second prong of the analysis and upheld the
nonresident hunting restrictions.222
States may now use Hoeven to extend nonresident restrictions even
further than those now in effect.223 Furthermore, states could attempt to
extend Hoeven to other areas of law when granting residents preferred benefits over nonresidents.224 Previous case law, in some respects, encourages
this extension because the fundamental rights protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause are not enumerated.225
But states also realize the immense economic benefits generated from
nonresident hunting.226 In Missouri, for example, hunting generates revenue of over $853 million annually, and at least $148 million of this comes

215. Id.
216. Id. at *12-13.
217. Id. at *14.
218. Id. at *15.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *19.
222. Id.
223. Smith, supra note 209, at 15C.
224. See 35A AM. JUR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 41 (2006) (“The inquiry
in each case must be concerned with the question as to whether reasons for differentiation between
residents and nonresidents exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to
them.”).
225. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
226. Ken Newton, “Big-Game Bucks”: Out-of-State Hunters Funnel Money Into the Region,
ST. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESS (Mo.), Nov. 19, 2006, at State & Regional News.
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from nonresident hunters.227 This is not an isolated occurrence, as communities nationwide benefit from the economic surplus brought by nonresident
hunters.228 According to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, hunting expenditures accounted for a total of $20.6 billion in 2001, including
approximately $5.3 billion in trip-related expenses alone.229 Migratory bird
hunters alone spent $1.4 billion for hunting trips and equipment in 2001.230
Such statistics are impressive when considering the ripple effects
throughout the economy.231 For example, waterfowl hunting expenditures
in 2001 created 21,415 jobs, over $129.5 million in state tax revenue, and
$201.8 million in federal tax revenue.232 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Hoeven may impact some of the $2.3 billion in total economic output
generated by waterfowl hunters if nonresident hunters reduce their expenditures or stop hunting out-of-state due to increased restrictions like those
upheld in Hoeven.233
B. NORTH DAKOTA
The impact on North Dakota is more readily apparent as the balancing
of resident and nonresident interests continues to be one of the biggest
challenges faced by the North Dakota Game and Fish Department, the
North Dakota Legislature, and local communities.234 North Dakota officials
are satisfied with Hoeven’s “implications on future wildlife-management
decisions.”235 But it is not yet known whether the present restrictions will
satisfy North Dakota residents’ concerns over competition for prime hunting spots, although other circumstances, such as environmental conditions,
factor into this equation.236

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2001 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 32 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2002pubs/FHW01.pdf.
230. Id. at 34.
231. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WATERFOWL HUNTING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ADDENDUM TO THE 2001 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 10 (2005), available at http://library.fws.gov/nat_
survey2001_waterfowlhunting.pdf.
232. Id. at 10.
233. Id.
234. Richard Hinton, Hanging Up His Hat: Dean Hildebrand to Retire by Year’s End,
BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), June 18, 2005, at 1A.
235. Rafferty, supra note 210, at Bus. & Financial News.
236. See Residents Only on PLOTS Oct. 14-20, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Oct. 4, 2006, at 1C4C (discussing the increased difficulty in finding prime hunting spots due to the decrease in
wetlands).
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The Legislative Council’s report, which was the basis of the restrictions in Hoeven, recognized that time restrictions on nonresident hunters
might not solve the residents’ calls for greater hunting opportunity.237 This
is because waterfowl hunting depends largely on the timing of migration,
which, in turn, depends on the weather.238 In a recent national duck hunter
survey, North Dakota hunters responded that over the past five years, the
habitats where they hunt were neither better nor worse, and the overall
quality of their hunts was about the same.239
While hunting quality assessments are tougher to make, the quantitative data shows increased growth in both resident and nonresident hunters
in 2005.240 In 2005, North Dakota set a state record for resident hunters,
with approximately 26,000 more hunting licenses purchased than in 1990,
despite virtually no change in the state’s population.241 These record numbers will likely increase North Dakota’s $17.5 million total economic output generated in 2001 from waterfowl hunting.242 North Dakota may also
see the creation of more jobs because of the increase in hunters; in 2001,
waterfowl hunting created an estimated 236 jobs in the state.243 The figures
demonstrate why small town businesses opposed the nonresident hunting
restrictions at issue in Hoeven.244 With nonresident hunters making seventy-eight percent of their expenditures in rural areas, it is clear that even a
minor decrease in the number of hunters due to the upheld restrictions could
drastically impact rural businesses that depend on the influx of out-of-state
customers.245
Despite the economic concerns, North Dakota officials have pledged to
continue to place residents first in addressing future wildlife regulations.246
However, North Dakota residents may feel the negative effects of Hoeven
in other states in the form of retaliatory legislation.247 Particularly in

237. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY B, 57TH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, RESIDENT
NONRESIDENT ISSUES STUDY BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM 4 (N.D. 2001), available at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/ assembly/57-2001/docs/pdf/39029.pdf.
238. Id.
239. Richard Hinton, North Dakota Duck Hunters Seem Satisfied, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.),
Mar. 22, 2006, at 1C.
240. Richard Hinton, Year End Review: Part II, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Jan. 3, 2007, at 1C3C.
241. Doug Leier, Outdoors, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Jan. 17, 2007, at 1C.
242. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 224, at 11.
243. Id. at 10.
244. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY B, supra note 237, at 4.
245. Id. at 5.
246. Richard Hinton, Steinwand Has Full Agenda as New Game and Fish Director,
BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Mar. 5, 2006, at 1A.
247. Rafferty, supra note 210, at Bus. & Financial News.
AND
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Minnesota, retaliatory legislation is more than a possibility because a
proposed bill would restrict nonresidents from fishing during the first two
weeks of the season.248 However, state officials from Minnesota and North
Dakota cautioned against strong reactions.249
As for further state regulations, the 2007 North Dakota legislative
session will not have the contentious atmosphere of two years ago when the
original restrictions were put in place.250 Indeed, the legislature seemed to
make a policy reversal by relaxing certain zoning restrictions against nonresident waterfowl hunting.251 At the same time, certain bills that have
been introduced implicate other wildlife management areas by calling for an
increase in nonresident fees for a fishing license.252 Despite any increase in
nonresident restrictions, state officials remain determined to attract nonresidents to continue growing the state’s tourism industry and to support local
communities that thrive on the incoming business.253
V. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Hoeven, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
North Dakota’s restrictions on nonresident hunters, reaffirming states’
rights to manage wildlife resources within their borders.254 The court neglected to reach the merits of the dormant Commerce Clause claim, instead
holding the claim moot due to the passage of the “Reaffirmation of State
Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of
2005.”255 The court also rejected Minnesota’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause claim because hunting is recreation and sport, which is not recognized as part of the bundle of property rights associated with the ownership
or lease of land.256
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